


Why Every Physicist Should Be a Bayesian

(Towards a Complete Reconciliation between the Bayesian and the Frequentist Schools of Parametric Inference)

Tomaž Podobnik




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
Recommended reading:

R. D. Cousins, "*Why Isn't Every Physicist a Bayesian?*",
Amer. J. Phys. 63 (1995) 398.

"Physicists embarking on seemingly routine error analyses are finding themselves grappling with major conceptual issues which have divided the statistical community for years. ... *The lurking controversy* can come as a shock to a graduate student who encounters a statistical problem at some late stage in writing up the Ph.D. dissertation."




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Basic Principles of scientific reasoning (Popper, 1959, pp. 91-92):

1. **Principle of Consistency:** Every theory must be internally consistent: if a conclusion can be reasoned out in more than one way, then every possible way must lead to the same result. Also, identical states of knowledge in a problem must always lead to identical solutions of the problem.
2. **Operational Principle:** Every theory must specify operations that ensure falsifiability of its predictions.






Direct probabilities (=long term relative frequencies):

$p(x_1 | I)$: probability for observing $x = x_1$ (for observing $x \in (x_1, x_1 + dx)$), given information I

$f(x | I)$: probability density function (pdf);
 $p(x | I) = f(x | I) dx$

$I = \theta I_0$: I_0 = family of sampling distributions
 θ = parameter

$F(x, \theta, I_0) \equiv \int_{x_a}^x f(x' | \theta I_0) dx'$: (cumulative) distribution function (cdf)



Location and scale parameters:

$$f(x | \mu I_0) = \phi(x - \mu); \quad x \in (-\infty, \infty)$$


$\mu \in (-\infty, \infty) \equiv$ location parameter

$$f(x | \sigma I_0) = \frac{1}{\sigma} \phi\left(\frac{x}{\sigma}\right); \quad x \in (0, \infty)$$

$\sigma \in (0, \infty) \equiv$ scale parameter

$$f(x | \mu \sigma I_0) = \frac{1}{\sigma} \phi\left(\frac{x - \mu}{\sigma}\right); \quad x \in (-\infty, \infty)$$

$\mu \in (-\infty, \infty) \equiv$ location parameter
 $\sigma \in (0, \infty) \equiv$ scale (dispersion) parameter






Examples:

$$f(x | \mu \sigma I_0) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}\sigma} \exp\left\{-\frac{(x-\mu)^2}{2\sigma^2}\right\} = \frac{1}{\sigma} \phi\left(\frac{x-\mu}{\sigma}\right)$$

$\mu \equiv$ location parameter
 $\sigma \equiv$ scale (dispersion) parameter
 $I_0 \equiv$ Gaussian distribution

$$F(x, \mu, \sigma, I_0) = \int_{-\infty}^x f(x' | \mu \sigma I_0) dx'$$





Axioms of conditional probability:


- every probability distribution is conditional upon the available (relevant) information.

$$1. f(x | \theta I_0) \geq 0$$

$$2. f(xy | \theta I_0) = f(x | \theta I_0) f(y | x \theta I_0) \\ = f(y | \theta I_0) f(x | y \theta I_0)$$

$$3. \int_x f(x | \theta I_0) dx = 1$$

$$4. f(y | \theta \tilde{I}_0) = f(x | \theta I_0) \left| \frac{\partial y}{\partial x} \right|^{-1}; \quad y = y(x) \text{ one-to-one}$$



Example:

$$f(x | \sigma I_0) = \frac{1}{\sigma} \exp\left\{-\frac{x}{\sigma}\right\} = \frac{1}{\sigma} \phi\left(\frac{x}{\sigma}\right);$$

$\Rightarrow \sigma = \text{scale parameter}$


$$\left. \begin{array}{l} y \equiv \ln x \\ \mu \equiv \ln \sigma \end{array} \right\} \Rightarrow f(y | \mu \tilde{I}_0) = f(x | \sigma I_0) \left| \frac{\partial y}{\partial x} \right|^{-1}$$
$$= e^{(y-\mu)} \exp\{-e^{(y-\mu)}\}$$


$$\equiv \tilde{\phi}(y - \mu) \Rightarrow \mu = \text{location parameter}$$

$I_0 \equiv \text{exponential distribution} \rightarrow \tilde{I}_0: \text{distribution not exponential}$



Scale parameter reducible to location parameter!





Parametric inference:


Given measured $x \in (x_1, x_1 + dx)$, specify degree of belief

$$(\theta_1 | x_1 I_0): \theta \in (\theta_1, \theta_1 + d\theta)$$

Probabilistic approach (Bayesian school):


$$(\theta | x I_0) \rightarrow p(\theta | x I_0) = f(\theta | x I_0) d\theta$$

N. b.: $f(\theta | x I_0)$ distribution of our belief in different values of θ , not (!) distribution of θ .




Axioms of *inverse* probability:

1. $f(\theta | xI_0) \geq 0$
2.
$$f(\theta v | xI_0) = f(\theta | xI_0) f(v | \theta xI_0)$$
$$= f(v | xI_0) f(\theta | v xI_0)$$
3.
$$\int_{\Theta} f(\theta | xI_0) d\theta = 1$$
4.
$$f(v | x\tilde{I}_0) = f(\theta | xI_0) \left| \frac{\partial v}{\partial \theta} \right|^{-1}; \quad v = v(\theta) \text{ one-to-one}$$
5.
$$f(\theta x_2 | x_1 I_0) = f(\theta | x_1 I_0) f(x_2 | \theta x_1 I_0)$$
$$= f(x_2 | x_1 I_0) f(\theta | x_2 x_1 I_0)$$



Pro's for subjecting degrees of belief to the Axioms of probability:

1. "It is *not excluded a priori* that the same mathematical theory may serve two purposes." (Pólya, 1954, Chapter XV, p. 116)
2. Cox's Theorem: Every theory of plausible inference is either *isomorphic to probability theory or inconsistent* with very general qualitative requirements (e.g., $(\theta \in (\theta_1, \theta_1 + \theta) | x_1 I_0) \rightarrow (\theta \notin (\theta_1, \theta_1 + \theta) | x_1 I_0)$). (Cox, 1946)
3. Dutch Book Theorem (de Finetti): A "Dutch Book" can be organized *against anyone whose betting coefficients violate axioms of probability*. (Howson and Urbach, 1991)



Pro's (cont'd):

4. Avoiding **adhockeries**. (O'Hagan, 2000, p. 20)

5. **Powerful tools**: marginalization and Bayes' Theorem (Bayes, 1763)


$$f(\theta v | x I_0) = f(\theta | x I_0) f(v | \theta x I_0) \Rightarrow f(\theta | x I_0) = \int_{\mathcal{N}} f(\theta v' | x I_0) d v'$$



$$f(\theta v | x I_0) = f(v | x I_0) f(\theta | v x I_0) \Rightarrow f(v | x I_0) = \int_{\Theta} f(\theta' v | x I_0) d \theta'$$

$$f(\theta | x_1 I_0) f(x_2 | \theta x_1 I_0) = f(x_2 | x_1 I_0) f(\theta | x_2 x_1 I_0); \quad f(x_2 | \theta x_1 I_0) = f(x_2 | \theta I_0)$$

$$\Rightarrow f(\theta | x_2 x_1 I_0) = \frac{f(\theta | x_1 I_0) f(x_2 | \theta I_0)}{f(x_2 | x_1 I_0)}; \quad f(x_2 | x_1 I_0) = \int_{\Theta} f(\theta' | x_1 I_0) f(x_2 | \theta' I_0) d \theta'$$




But...(con's): a) how to assign $f(\theta | x_1 I_0)$???
b) what are verifiable predictions???

If making use of Bayes' Theorem:

$$f(\theta | x_1 I_0) = \frac{f(\theta | I_0) f(x_1 | \theta I_0)}{\int_{\Theta} f(\theta' | I_0) f(x_1 | \theta' I_0) d\theta'}$$

$f(\theta | I_0)$: non-informative prior (distribution)

"According to Bayesian philosophy it is also possible to make statements concerning the unknown θ in the absence of data, and these statements can be summarized in a prior distribution."
(Villegas, 1980)



Example: The Principle of Insufficient Reason (Bayes, 1763;
Laplace, 1886, p. XVII)

$$f(\theta|I_0) = C; \quad C^{-1} = \int_{\theta_a}^{\theta_b} f(\theta'|I_0) d\theta' = \theta_b - \theta_a$$

Twofold problem:


a) (θ_a, θ_b) infinite (e.g., $\theta_b = \infty$) $\Rightarrow \nexists \int_{\theta_a}^{\theta_b} f(\theta'|I_0) d\theta'$

b) $f(\theta|I_0)$ not invariant under non-linear transformations

$$v = \theta^2 \Rightarrow f(v|\tilde{I}_0) = f(\theta|I_0) \left| \frac{\partial v}{\partial \theta} \right|^{-1} \propto \frac{1}{\sqrt{v}} \neq \text{const} (-*-)$$



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


"A succession of authors have said that the **prior probability is nonsense** and that the **principle of inverse probability**, which cannot work without it, **is nonsense too.**" (Jeffreys, 1961, p. 120)

"During the rapid development of practical statistics in the past few decades, the theoretical foundations of the subject have been involved in great obscurity. The obscurity is centred in the so-called 'inverse' methods. ... **The inverse probability is a mistake** (perhaps **the only mistake to which the mathematical world has so deeply committed itself**)." (Fisher, 1922)




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Long-lasting and fierce controversy:


"The essence of the present theory is that **no probability, direct, prior, or posterior, is simply a frequency.**" (Jeffreys, 1961, p. 401)

"**Probability is a ratio of frequencies.**" (Fisher, 1922, p.326)



Twofold aim of the lecture:

1. Overcome conceptual and practical problems concerning assignment of probability distributions to inferred parameters;
2. Reconcile the Bayesian and the frequentist schools of parametric inference.



Consistency Theorem: How to assign $f(\theta|x_1I_0)$?

Assumptions:


a) x_1 and x_2 two independent measurements from $f(x|\theta I_0)$:

$$f(x_2|x_1\theta I_0) = f(x_2|\theta I_0) \quad \text{and} \quad f(x_1|x_2\theta I_0) = f(x_1|\theta I_0);$$

b) $f(\theta|x_1I_0)$ and $f(\theta|x_2I_0)$ can be assigned.

Then (Bayes' Theorem):

$$f(\theta|x_2x_1I_0) = \frac{f(\theta|x_1I_0)f(x_2|\theta I_0)}{f(x_2|x_1I_0)} \quad ; \quad f(\theta|x_1x_2I_0) = \frac{f(\theta|x_2I_0)f(x_1|\theta I_0)}{f(x_1|x_2I_0)}$$



Consistency:


$$f(\theta | x_2 x_1 I_0) = f(\theta | x_1 x_2 I_0)$$

$$\Rightarrow f(\theta | x I_0) = \frac{\pi(\theta) f(x | \theta I_0)}{\eta(x)}$$

Strikingly similar to Bayes'  Theorem, but...

$\pi(\theta)$: consistency factor; not(!) probability distribution (e.g., need not be normalizable);

$\eta(x)$: normalization factor $\eta(x) \equiv \int_{\Theta} \pi(\theta') f(x | \theta' I_0) d\theta'$




Properties of $\pi(\theta)$:

1. Determined only up to a multiplication constant (say k);
2. Transformation $\pi(\theta) \rightarrow \tilde{\pi}(v)$ under $\theta \rightarrow v$ (one-to-one):

$$\left. \begin{aligned} f(v | x\tilde{I}_0) &= f(\theta | xI_0) \left| \frac{\partial v}{\partial \theta} \right|^{-1} \\ f(v | x\tilde{I}_0) &= \frac{\tilde{\pi}(v) f(x | v\tilde{I}_0)}{\tilde{\eta}(x)} \end{aligned} \right\} \Rightarrow \tilde{\pi}(v) = k \pi(\theta) \left| \frac{\partial v}{\partial \theta} \right|^{-1} \quad \square$$

3. Depends on I_0 (=the only available information before data (x_1, x_2, \dots) are collected).



◀ Consistency:

$$\tilde{I}_0 = I_0 \Rightarrow \tilde{\pi}(v) \propto \pi(v)$$

(a.k.a. The Principle of Relative Invariance; Hartigan, 1964)

Example:


$$f(t | \tau I_0) = \frac{1}{\tau} \exp\left\{-\frac{t}{\tau}\right\} = \frac{1}{\tau} \phi\left(\frac{t}{\tau}\right) \quad (\tau = \text{scale parameter});$$

$$g_a \in \mathcal{G}: t \rightarrow g_a(t) = at \equiv y; \quad \text{group } \mathcal{G}: X \rightarrow X$$

$$\bar{g}_a \in \bar{\mathcal{G}}: \tau \rightarrow \bar{g}_a(\tau) = a\tau \equiv v; \quad (\text{induced}) \text{ group } \bar{\mathcal{G}}: \Theta \rightarrow \Theta$$

$$\Rightarrow f(y | v \tilde{I}_0) = f(t | \tau I_0) \left| \frac{\partial v}{\partial \tau} \right|^{-1} = \frac{1}{v} \exp\left\{-\frac{y}{v}\right\} = \frac{1}{v} \phi\left(\frac{y}{v}\right) = f(y | v I_0)$$


$$\Rightarrow f(t | \tau I_0) \text{ invariant under } \mathcal{G} \Rightarrow \pi(a\tau) = k(a)\pi(\tau) \frac{1}{a} \equiv h(a)\pi(\tau)$$



Similarly:

Distribution	Inv. transformation	Functional equation	Solution
$f(x \mu \sigma I_0) = \frac{1}{\sigma} \phi\left(\frac{x - \mu}{\sigma}\right)$	$x \rightarrow ax + b$ $\mu \rightarrow a\mu + b$ $\sigma \rightarrow a\sigma$	$\pi(a\mu + b, a\sigma) = h(a, b)\pi(\mu, \sigma)$	$\pi_{LS}(\mu, \sigma) \propto \sigma^{-r}$
$f(x \mu \sigma I_0) = \phi(x - \mu)$	$x \rightarrow x + b$ $\mu \rightarrow \mu + b$	$\pi(\mu + b) = h(b)\pi(\mu)$	$\pi_L(\mu) \propto e^{-q\mu}$
$f(x \mu \sigma I_0) = \frac{1}{\sigma} \phi\left(\frac{x}{\sigma}\right)$	$x \rightarrow ax$ $\sigma \rightarrow a\sigma$	$\pi(a\sigma) = h(a)\pi(\sigma)$	$\pi_S(\sigma) \propto \sigma^{-(q+1)}$

r, q : constants




Product rule and Marginalization:



$$\pi_{LS}(\mu, \sigma) \propto \pi_L(\mu) \pi_S(\sigma)$$

$$\Rightarrow \pi_L(\mu) \propto 1 \text{ and } \pi_S(\sigma) \propto \pi_{LS}(\mu, \sigma) \propto \sigma^{-1}$$

Consistency factors determined uniquely (up to an arbitrary multiplication constant) exclusively by observing the Axioms of Probability and the Principle of Consistency.



Examples: Inferring parameters of Gaussian distribution.


$\mathbf{x} \equiv (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$ independent measurements, sampled from

$$f(x | \mu \sigma I_0) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}\sigma} \exp\left\{-\frac{(x - \mu)^2}{2\sigma^2}\right\}$$

$$\bar{x}_n \equiv \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n x_i \quad \text{and} \quad s_n^2 \equiv \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - \bar{x}_n)^2$$

a) Both μ and σ unknown:

$$f(\mu \sigma | \mathbf{x} I_0) \propto \pi_{LS}(\mu, \sigma) f(\mathbf{x} | \mu \sigma I_0) = \pi_{LS}(\mu, \sigma) \prod_{i=1}^n f(x_i | \mu \sigma I_0) \propto \sigma^{-n} \prod_{i=1}^n f(x_i | \mu \sigma I_0)$$



Marginalization:

$$f(\mu | \mathbf{x} I_0) = \int_0^{\infty} f(\mu \sigma' | \mathbf{x} I_0) d\sigma' = \frac{\Gamma(n/2)}{\Gamma((n-1)/2)} \frac{(ns_n^2)^{n/2}}{\sqrt{\pi s_n^2}} \frac{1}{[ns_n^2 + n(\bar{x}_n - \mu)^2]^{n/2}}$$


$$f(\sigma | \mathbf{x} I_0) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f(\mu' \sigma | \mathbf{x} I_0) d\mu' = \frac{(ns_n^2)^{(n-1)/2}}{2^{(n-3)/2} \Gamma((n-1)/2)} \frac{1}{\sigma^n} \exp\left\{-\frac{ns_n^2}{2\sigma^2}\right\}$$

b) Only μ unknown:



$$f(\mu | \sigma \mathbf{x} \tilde{I}_0) \propto \pi_L(\mu) f(\mathbf{x} | \mu \sigma I_0) = \pi_L(\mu) \prod_{i=1}^n f(x_i | \mu \sigma I_0) \propto \sqrt{\frac{n}{2\pi}} \frac{1}{\sigma} \exp\left\{-\frac{n(\bar{x}_n - \mu)^2}{2\sigma^2}\right\}$$


c) Only σ unknown:

$$f(\sigma | \mu \mathbf{x} \tilde{I}_0) \propto \pi_S(\sigma) f(\mathbf{x} | \mu \sigma I_0) \propto \frac{[n(\bar{x} - \mu)^2 + ns_n^2]^{n/2}}{\Gamma(n/2) 2^{n/2-1}} \frac{1}{\sigma^{n+1}} \exp\left\{-\frac{n(\bar{x} - \mu)^2 + ns_n^2}{2\sigma^2}\right\}$$



For $n=2$, $\bar{x}_2=0$ and $s_2^2=1$:





Comments:


a) Consistency factors **not** normalizable, e.g., $\nexists \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \pi(\mu') d\mu'$,
 $\Rightarrow \pi(\theta)$ **not** a probability distribution!!!

$$\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \pi(\mu') d\mu'$$

b) Consistency factors for the parameters of distributions that are invariant under **Lie groups** of transformations.

☐ Necessary condition: reducibility of θ to location parameter (not a disaster; see below). ☐

☐ \Rightarrow enough to determine $\pi(\mu)$.



"The most striking achievement of physical sciences is prediction."

(Pólya, 1954, p. 64)




Calibration (coverage):


- $f(\theta | x I_0)$ calibrated if coverage of confidence intervals (θ_1, θ_2) coincides with probability

$$P(\theta \in (\theta_1, \theta_2) | x I_0) = \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} f(\theta' | x I_0) d\theta'$$

- Fiducial theory: $f(\theta | x I_0) = \left| \frac{\partial}{\partial \theta} F(x, \theta, I_0) \right|$ ($F(x, \theta, I_0)$ monotone in θ ;
Fisher, 1956, p. 70)




Important:

1. $\pi_L(\mu)=1$ and $\pi_S(\sigma)=\pi_{LS}(\mu,\sigma)=\sigma^{-1}$ ensure calibrated inferences;
2. Exact calibration \Rightarrow "Dutch Book" impossible;
3. Consistency theorem and Fiducial argument combined \Rightarrow
 θ necessarily reducible to a location parameter (Lindley, 1958). 




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Therefore:

The Principle of Consistency and The Operational Principle are equivalent (identical consistency factors & applicable under identical circumstances).


⇒ complete reconciliation between the Bayesian and the Frequentist schools of parametric inference!!!




Probabilistic parametric inference not universal (e.g., pre-constrained parameters, counting experiments).

Remedy (under fairly general conditions): "Repetitio est mater studiorum." (Latin proverb)

Example: inferring pre-constrained τ of an exponential distribution.








Example: inferring parameter θ of a binomial distribution

$$p(n | \theta n_0 I_0) = \binom{n_0}{n} \theta^n (1-\theta)^{n_0-n}; \quad \begin{array}{l} n_0 \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \in \mathbb{N}_0; n \leq n_0 \end{array}$$

$$n_0\theta, n_0(1-\theta) \gg 1: \quad F(n, n_0, \theta, I_0) = \sum_{i=0}^n p(i | \theta n_0 I_0) \approx \int_{-\infty}^{n+0.5} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}\sigma} \exp\left\{-\frac{(x'-\mu)^2}{2\sigma^2}\right\} dx'$$


$$\mu = n_0\theta, \quad \sigma = \sqrt{n_0\theta(1-\theta)}$$






Conclusions:

1. Consistency Theorem (instead of Bayes' Theorem) for assigning $f(\theta|x,I_0)$;
2. Equivalence of the Consistency Principle and the Operational Principle for determination of $\pi(\theta)$;
3. Equivalence of the Bayesian and the frequentist schools of parametric inference.



Applications:

1. Simple parametric inference;
2. Inference about the parameters of linear models (e.g., histogram fitting and partial wave analyses) (Stuart, Ord and Arnold, 1999);
3. Inference about the parameters of dynamical models: $\theta = \theta(t)$ (e.g., Kalman filter (Brown and Hwang, 1983));
4. Predictive distributions ($\mathbf{x} = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$ from $f(x | \theta I_0) \rightarrow f(x_{n+1} | \mathbf{x} I_0)$).




Warning:

Several "Principles" for determination of $f(\theta|I_0)$: the Laplace Principle of Insufficient Reason (Bayes, 1763; Laplace, 1886, p. XVII), the Principle of Maximum Entropy (Jaynes, 2003, pp. 343-377), Reference Priors (Bernardo, 1979), the Principle of Group (Form) Invariance (Harney, 2003), the Principle of Reduction (Dawid, 1977):

- a) resulting $f(\theta|I_0)$ not unique;
- b) "Principles" inconsistent with Axioms of inverse probability;
- c) Non-calibrated inferences.



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


Which kind of approach has been being advocated, frequentist or Bayesian?

Depends....



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
If:

1. **Frequentist** \equiv axioms of conditional probability only applicable to sampling distributions.
2. **Bayesian** \equiv (non-informative) prior probability distributions indispensable in the process of inference.

...then **none** of the two.



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


If:

1. **Frequentist** \equiv observing the Operational Principle.
2. **(Objective) Bayesian** \equiv observing the Principle of Consistency.



...then both.




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
Erratum: Inference about the parameters of Weibull distribution **can** be reduced to a location-scale problem.

T.P. and Živko, T. On Probabilistic Inference about the Parameters of Sampling Distributions.



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
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